Introduction
Incident reporting is considered a key component of biosafety programs. However, little to no consensus exists on what constitutes an incident, what and how incidents should be reported, and how to utilize incident reporting data if and when they are collected. Indeed, a 2008 survey on biosafety training and incident reporting practices in the United States found no consensus among biosafety professionals on "what incident reporting practices are considered standard or sufficient" (Chamberlain et al., 2009 ). This same survey adopted a working definition of an incident for laboratories working with infectious agents as "any occurrence that has the potential to lead to unintended exposure of the agent to humans, animals or the environment" (Chamberlain et al., 2009 ).
This rather broad definition clearly covers incident types that have mandated reporting requirements. For example, needlesticks and other employee injuries must be logged at covered entities (OSHA, 2001) . The National Institutes of Health (NIH) Guidelines for Research Involving Recombinant or Synthetic Nucleic Acid Molecules requires reporting to the Office of Biotechnology Activities (OBA) of any loss of containment, spills, accidents, or potential exposures to organisms containing recombinant or synthetic nucleic acid molecules as a condition of research support by NIH (NIH, 2013) . Likewise, entities covered by the Select Agent Regulations 42 CFR Part 73 are required to report any theft, loss, or release of any select agent or toxin to the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) or Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service (APHIS) of the U.S. Department of Agriculture (CDC, 2005) . Due to these reporting requirements, most entities would include these types of incidents in their internal reporting procedures, although some variation in reporting channels may exist, depending on the type of incident. However, the above definition could also easily encompass many other types of incidents that do not have any mandated reporting requirements.
The Center for Microbial Genetics and Genomics (MGGen) at Northern Arizona University (NAU) has chosen a highly inclusive model of incident reporting for its BSL-3 Select Agent Facility (the Facility). Any incident that concerns biosafety or security in the Facility, however minor, must be reported using its internal incident reporting form. This internal incident reporting form collects data concerning the circumstances of an incident (i.e., who, what, where, when, and how) , what was done to mitigate the incident, and ideas for the future prevention of an incident. MGGen also electronically monitors ingress and egress for all doors within the Facility, enabling the determination of the number of hours worked in the Facility over a given time period. This article examines 3 years of MGGen Facility incident report and ingress/egress data to identify the types of incidents occurring, the number of incidents occurring per hours worked, any differences in the incident rate between experienced versus trainee laboratorians, and any safety improvements that could help to reduce identified incident types. This analysis is presented as a model for incident tracking and analysis that can be adapted to other biocontainment facilities to suit their unique incident analysis needs.
Materials and Methods
This report analyzes incident report data collected using MGGen's internal incident reporting form over a 3-year period, from September 2010 through August 2013. These data were analyzed in conjunction with the number of hours worked in the Facility over this same time period. The number of hours worked in the Facility was based upon the ingress/egress data for the outermost door of the Facility leading to the gowning room. As such, these time data represent an overestimate of the number of hours the laboratorians actually worked with pathogens.
Incidents were assigned to one of five major categories: spills, standard operating procedure (SOP) noncompliance, breach in personal protective equipment (PPE), broken equipment, and air plate growth (Figure 1) . Incidents in the spill category were further subdivided into 10 subcategories: sample processing spill, dropped item, bounced pipette tip, contaminated PPE, drip from pipette tip, leaking container, open/cracked tube in centrifuge rotor, bounced loop, dropped/misplaced agar plate, and Form 3 (Figure 2 ). Incidents that could be placed into two different categories were recorded as 0.5 incidents in each relevant category (e.g., a drip from a pipette tip that landed on a secondary glove was recorded as 0.5 contaminated PPE and 0.5 drip from pipette tip incidents). The number of different types and overall incidents was compared by year using a combination of histograms and ANOVA (Figures 3 and 4) .
Regression analysis was performed to examine the relationship between number of hours worked and number of incidents. Regressions of incidents per month versus hours worked per month ( Air plate: agar plate left exposed in areas of the BSC where an aerosol might occur; mostly used to assist in monitoring new procedures.
were both used to evaluate this relationship. Two multiple regression analyses were attempted wherein a second predictor variable aimed at capturing the effect of "experience" on the number of observed incidents was added. In the first attempt, the hours worked per month variable was subdivided into two variables, User (i.e., fully trained and independent laboratorian) hours worked per month and Trainee (i.e., laboratorian in the process of completing required hands-on training, under the direct supervision of a User) hours worked per month, and used as predictors of the response variable, number of incidents per month. A second attempt utilized the variables total hours worked per month and User:Trainee ratio (i.e., number of fully trained laboratorians per trainee laboratorian) per month as predictors of the number of incidents per month.
T-tests were used to evaluate any difference in the incident rate between User and Trainee laboratorians. The first t-test compared the number of incidents/100 hours worked for 26 Users and 20 Trainees during the 3-year period. A second, paired t-test, compared the number of incidents/100 hours worked between 13 laboratorians' Trainee periods versus their User periods during the analyzed 3-year time period.
Results
A total of 148 incidents were reported for the MGGen Facility over the analyzed 3-year time period. A total of 9,571 hours worked were recorded over this same time period, yielding an overall incident rate of 1.55 incidents Sample Processing Spill: spill that occurred while processing samples that did not fall into any other defined spill subcategory; Dropped Item: item that was dropped that led to a spill of potentially infectious material (e.g., tube cap); Bounced Pipette Tip/ Loop: pipette tip/loop that "bounced" out of the biohazard waste bag onto the surface of the BSC when the laboratorian ejected/discarded the used pipette tip/loop; Contaminated PPE: PPE that became contaminated (e.g., touching a contaminated surface with a secondary glove, drip onto secondary glove, etc.); Leaking Container: compromised container that led to a spill of potentially infectious material; Open/ Cracked Tube in Centrifuge Rotor: tube containing potentially contaminated material that became compromised while being centrifuged in a sealed aerosol-resistant centrifuge rotor that was discovered when the rotor was opened inside of a BSC; Dropped/Misplaced Agar Plate: agar plate that was dropped or misplaced, leading to a spill of potentially infectious material; Form 3: theft, loss, or release of a select agent or toxin leading to the filing of an APHIS/CDC Form 3 (Report of Theft, Loss or Release of Select Agents and Toxins). Incidents per laboratorian as a function of hours worked per laboratorian. The correlation between hours worked and incidents for N = 34 laboratorians is presented along with the equation for the regression line. The data points marked with an "a" or a "b" indicate outliers where laboratorians were reproached for habitually rushing while working in the MGGen Facility or habitually working long hours in the MGGen Facility, respectively.
per 100 hours worked (Table 1) . No difference in the rate of incidents (incidents/100 hours worked/month) was detected among the 3 years (F = 0.13, p = 0.88). A total of 34 laboratorians worked in the Facility over this 3-year time period. There was an average of 23 laboratorians in any month over this time period (average of 17 Users and 6 Trainees), with an average of 16 (72%) of these laboratorians actually working in the Facility in any month (average of 12 Users and 4 Trainees).
Most (72%) of the recorded incidents involved a spill of some sort (Figure 1 ). All of these spill incidents were relatively low consequence, involving very low volumes (drip-sized to <2 mL) and mostly (98%) occurring inside a biosafety cabinet (BSC). None of the spill incidents led to an exposure. Review of the various spill incidents revealed 10 subcategories (Figure 2 ). Many of these identified spill incident types, particularly those involving a sample processing spill or dropped item (51% of the spill incidents), lacked an obvious proximate cause, making the identification of specific mitigation measures difficult. Other spill incident types, upon further investigation, revealed a proximate cause that could be mitigated in some way. Indeed, although the overall rate of the major incident types remained relatively constant over the analyzed 3-year time period (Figure 3 ), the rate of the identified spill incident types displayed some marked variation (Figure 4 ). Of particular interest was the decrease in frequency of spill incidents in the drip from pipette tip, leaking container, open/ cracked tube in centrifuge rotor, bounced loop, and bounced pipette tip subcategories (Figure 4) , all of which were targeted with specific mitigation measures.
The drip from pipette tip subcategory was the first spill incident type to be targeted with specific mitigation measures. A series of spill incidents in this subcategory was observed in 2011 (Figure 4 ). This prompted a discussion which led to the suggestion that these incidents were possibly related to deteriorating O-rings in the dripping pipettes. Upon replacement of the O-rings, the spill incidents related to drips from pipette tips ceased in 2011. Subsequently, the observation of two such incidents in 2012 immediately prompted inspection and replacement of Orings in the affected pipettes. This was followed by the cessation of this incident type through 2013 (Figure 4 ).
Following this fortuitous observation, a more systematic approach to MGGen incident analysis was implemented. Specifically, a review and discussion of observed incidents was held among all of the MGGen laboratorians during a training session in October 2012. This review and discussion led to the identification of potential mitigation measures for some of the other spill incident types, including the leaking container, open/cracked tube in centrifuge rotor, bounced loop, and bounced pipette tip subcategories. For example, most of the spill incidents in the leaking container subcategory were related to compromised small biohazard autoclave bags used to discard waste inside the BSC. Implementation of more thorough inspections of these bags prior to use, as well as some secondary bagging procedures for some applications, was followed by the cessation of this type of spill incident (Figure 4) . Discussion of the open/cracked tube in centrifuge rotor subcategory led to the suggestion that this incident type might be due to laboratorians tilting the aerosol-resistant rotor too far when decontaminating the bottom of the rotor prior to removing it from the BSC for centrifugation. Informing the laboratorians of this possibility and adjusting the rotor decontamination procedure accordingly were followed by the cessation of this type of incident. Likewise, some discussion of the best way to discard a used inoculating loop was followed by the apparent end of the bounced loop spill incident type as well. A similar discussion of the best way to discard a used pipette tip may have contributed to the observed decrease in spill incidents due to a bounced pipette tip, though this spill incident type has not been completely eliminated (Figure 4) .
In contrast to the decreases observed in the above spill incident subcategories, an increase was observed in the dropped item subcategory over the analyzed 3-year time period. Unfortunately, neither a detailed review of the incident reports nor a discussion of observed incidents in a second MGGen laboratorian incident report training session in October 2013 could account for this observed increase in dropped items. An increase in the contaminated PPE spill incident subcategory between 2011 and 2012 also occurred. Similar to the dropped item subcategory, no obvious proximate cause, specific mitigation measures, or potential reason for the observed increase were identified for this spill incident type. Due to CDC's mandated reporting requirements and the potential consequences of a release outside of primary containment, any Form 3 spill incidents receive a more in-depth review, independent of any discussions during MGGen laboratorian incident report training sessions. Three Form 3s were recorded during the analyzed time frame. The first involved a tube containing a tissue sample that was shipped from a lower elevation to a higher elevation and became pressurized. When the tube was opened in a BSC, the pressurization caused a small amount of blood from the tissue sample to spatter. Some of the blood spattered outside of the BSC, leading to a release. The second Form 3 involved the accidental opening of an aerosol-resistant rotor outside of a BSC while it contained intact tubes of nearly complete DNA extractions (i.e., any agent was likely inactivated) of a select agent. The aerosol-resistant rotor belonged to a newly acquired centrifuge that had a different rotor release mechanism than other centrifuges in the Facility; this may have contributed to the laboratorian's accidental opening of the rotor. The third Form 3 involved a blood droplet that was underneath some parafilm ® (Bemis Company, Inc., Neenah, WI) on a surface-decontaminated sealed tube that was being manipulated outside a BSC for relabeling purposes. The reporting laboratorian had shifted the parafilm ® to put on the new label and noticed a blood droplet on her glove. In all three cases, the extensive PPE (Tyvek The second most common incident type involved SOP noncompliance (10%) (Figure 1 ). Most of these incidents involved some sort of minor entry/exit error or a failure to ensure a storage area inside the secure Facility was locked. For the most part these unlocked storage areas resulted from the use of combination padlocks that appeared to have been locked (i.e., appeared closed), but, on closer inspection, were actually not locked. The frequency of this incident type was decreased by instituting a policy of tugging on combination padlocks to ensure they were actually locked. The third most common incident type involved some sort of breach in PPE (Figure 1 ). These breaches in PPE mostly consisted of a hole in a secondary glove and sometimes a tear in a Tyvek ® suit. No exposures were identified as a result of these breaches in PPE. The remaining incident types were related to broken equipment (mostly broken pipettes) or growth on an air plate (Figure 1) .
Articles
The number of incidents was positively correlated with the number of hours worked. Regressions of both the number of incidents per month versus the number of hours worked per month (R 2 = 0.35, p = 0.0001) ( Figure 5 ) and the number of incidents per laboratorian versus the number of hours worked per laboratorian (R 2 = 0.43, p < 0.0001) ( Figure 6 ) were significant. The addition of a second predictor variable aimed at capturing the effect of "experience" on the number of observed incidents was not significant in either attempted multiple regression analysis.
In contrast, t-tests used to investigate the potential effect of experience on incident rate were significant at the Į = 0.1 level. Over the 3-year period, Users (N = 26) displayed an average of 1.4 incidents per 100 hours worked compared to 2.3 incidents per 100 hours worked for Trainees (N = 20) . This difference was significant at the Į = 0.1 level (t = 1.8, p = 0.077). Similarly, a one-tailed, paired ttest comparing the incidents per 100 hours worked for 13 laboratorians during their Trainee (2.6 incidents/100 hours worked) versus their User (1.6 incidents/100 hours worked) periods during the analyzed 3-year period was also significant at the Į = 0.1 level (t = 1.5, p > t = 0.079).
Discussion
The common cause hypothesis (CCH) is a central idea in safety. This hypothesis encompasses the idea that for every major incident with consequences there are many other similar minor incidents without consequences. This idea was originally proposed by industrial safety pioneer H. W. Heinrich in his 1931 seminal work, Industrial Accident Prevention (Heinrich, 1931) and is still relevant today, provided that incident data are properly analyzed. Indeed, more recent safety research has found that frequent minor incidents may be predictive of incident severity potential if examined appropriately with regards to causation (Manuele, 2011; Wright & van der Schaaf, 2004) . For example, a statistical analysis of incident reports in the UK railway domain found no difference in 18 types of causation among the three examined consequence levels (injury/ fatality, damage, and near miss), providing support for the CCH (Wright & van der Schaaf, 2004) and suggesting that the tracking of high-frequency, low-consequence, minor incidents can be a valuable tool for improving safety. Applying this principle to biosafety, however, can be challenging due to limitations in the amount and types of available incident data.
Biosafety-related incident reporting practices vary greatly among entities (Chamberlain et al., 2009) . Also, very little information exists, in general, on the types and frequency of incidents in biocontainment facilities, particularly with regards to lower consequence or minor incidents. Available published data deal primarily with higher consequence incidents such as laboratory acquired infections (LAIs) (Harding & Byers, 2006; Pike, 1979) and thefts, losses, and releases of select agents (Henkel et al., 2012) . Of these, LAI case studies provide some insight into the types of lower consequence or minor incidents that may be occurring in biocontainment facilities, since they often explore the laboratory environment in which an LAI occurred. However, this is far from comprehensive, making application of the CCH for potential incident prevention somewhat challenging.
This report presents a survey of all of the incidents occurring in a single BSL-3 select agent facility over a 3-year period, together with information on the hours worked in that facility over this same time period. This analysis provides information on the types and frequency of lower consequence incidents that occur in this type of facility. More importantly, however, this analysis also provides a model that could be adopted for tracking and analyzing incidents that occur in other biocontainment facilities. Important components of this model include: 1) tracking low-and high-consequence incidents; 2) recording incident rates; and 3) analyzing the collected data and using them as a communication tool.
The incident reporting model used in this analysis was highly inclusive, including any incident that concerned biosafety or security, however minor. This inclusive reporting policy proved highly informative in a number of ways. First, it provided an accurate incident count for use in calculating incident rates. Second, it enabled a causal analysis to be performed on some types of spill incidents, leading to the implementation of measures to reduce the frequency of and/or prevent some types of spill incidents. Without this highly inclusive reporting policy, many of these low consequence spill incidents likely would have been dismissed as unavoidable or to be expected when working in a biocontainment facility. This would be unfortunate, because at least some of these incidents had a proximate cause that could be mitigated to reduce both spills and potentially related and undetected aerosols. Finally, this incident reporting model provided a tangible measurement of potential hazards in the Facility that could be effectively communicated to laboratorians working in the Facility.
Crucial to this incident analysis was the ability to calculate incident rate. This depended upon both an accurate count of the incidents occurring in the Facility and accurate measurement of the hours worked in the Facility. Incident rate is a potentially highly useful metric for evaluating biosafety. This study shows that the incident rate at this Facility remained relatively constant over the 3-year period, suggesting that this may be the "baseline" incident rate for this Facility under this incident reporting model. This type of baseline incident rate is likely facility-and incident reporting model-specific, but, once known, could be very useful for evaluating the performance of biosafety programs over time. Incident rate analysis could also be used in other, more specific ways. For example, this analysis was able to show that Trainees had a higher incident rate than Users. Though this is not an unexpected result, this type of incident rate analysis could be applied to other situations. For example, laboratorians who had a higher than average incident rate could be evaluated to examine their techniques and to determine possible retraining needs. Likewise, procedures associated with higher incident rates could be evaluated for additional safety precautions.
Data analysis and communication of the findings were the final critical step in this incident analysis. The relatively large number of incident reports generated by such an inclusive incident reporting model could have been negatively perceived by outside auditors. However, the formal analyses performed on these data turned this potential liability into an asset by demonstrating that not only were incidents being reported, but also that effective oversight and follow up for incidents were occurring. Presentation of the incident analyses to the laboratorians had several benefits. First, it enhanced the overall incident analysis by allowing for laboratorian input on potential root causes of incidents, leading to the implementation of more effective mitigation strategies. Second, it functioned as a training opportunity by informing laboratorians of potential hazards in the Facility. Finally, it actively engaged the laboratorians in the incident review process and allowed for an active, nonjudgmental, team-oriented, problem-solving approach to evaluating incidents. This type of positive feedback approach has been shown to encourage the reporting of future incidents and should be promoted over approaches that might inadvertently lead to incident concealment due to fear of reprisals (Mahajan, 2010) .
Overall, this incident analysis model proved to be a useful addition to the biosafety program at the MGGen Facility at Northern Arizona University and an effective means of examining incidents, engaging laboratorians in the incident review process, and evaluating incident prevention strategies in accordance with the CCH. Moreover, this model could be easily adapted by other biocontainment facilities to address their unique incident tracking and analysis needs. Other facilities that may wish to adopt this type of incident tracking and analysis program should consider: 1) what types of incidents they want to track, keeping in mind the CCH and balancing the reporting burden against the potential benefits of incident prevention; 2) the analyses to be done, including potential metrics, such as the incident rate, that could be used to quantify and compare the collected incident report data; and 3) the most effective ways to utilize and communicate the findings of their chosen incident analysis plan.
